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NOTE
I GOT 99 PROBLEMS AND A WARRANT IS ONE:
HOW CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT OFFEND
INTERNATIONAL COMITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

As of 2012, there were 3.3 billion email accounts in the world and
that number is expected to increase by six percent each year, amounting
to approximately 4.3 billion accounts in 2016.' In 2013, there were
approximately 7.137 billion people in the world.2 This implies that
approximately half of the people in the world are email account holders.3
A large number of these emails are stored overseas.4 For example,
Microsoft, just one of the many companies that operate email servers,
recently admitted that the data from more than one billion of its
customers-including the data for over 20 million businesses-is stored
on one-hundred servers in forty countries.' This potentially subjects
millions of customer email to the overreaching tentacles of the U.S.
government without any Fourth Amendment protections.'
The Stored Communications Act of 1986 ("SCA")' was initially
passed by Congress to prevent unlawful government searches and
seizures of electronic information held by third parties.' Under the SCA,
law enforcement agencies may lawfully obtain electronic information

1.

THE RADICATI GRP., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2012-2016, at 2 (Sara Radicati ed.,

2012).
2.
3.

POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 2013 WORLD POPULATION SHEET 3 (2013).
See id.; THE RADICATI GRP., supra note 1, at 2.

4. See, e.g., Microsoft's Objections to the Magistrate's Order Denying Microsoft's Motion to
Vacate in Part a Search Warrant Seeking Customer Information Located Outside the United States
at 5-6, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained By Microsoft
Corp., 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29,2014) (No. 13-MJ-2814).
5. Id. at 8.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
8.

See id.; Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L.

REV. 373, 383 (2014).
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held by third parties via three methods: a court order,9 an administrative
subpoena,10 or a search warrant." Today, many critics argue that the
SCA does not adequately protect such communications.1 2 In the nearly
thirty years since the SCA was enacted, the idea of electronic storage has
drastically evolved." Now, Internet service providers ("ISP(s)") are
creating "server farms" or "data centers" 4 where massive amounts of
electronic data can be stored." More importantly, many of these "farms"
are located in other countries.' 6 This information may be obtainable
by U.S. law enforcement agencies through the use of a Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty ("MLAT"), which assists law enforcement
agencies in conducting searches and seizures abroad." Conversely, the
information sought may be outside U.S.-jurisdictional reach when there
is no MLAT between the United States and the country in where
information is stored.' 8
Nevertheless, an opinion recently issued in the Southern District of
New York in In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. ("Microsoft Case") held
that the SCA is applicable far beyond U.S. borders and thus may have
consequences for many unsuspecting email account holders.' 9 The court
9.
10.
11.

§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii).
§ 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).
§ 2703(b)(1)(A).

12.

See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's

Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1233 (2004); Alexander Scolnik, Note,
Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored Communications Act and the Fourth

Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349,382 (2009).
13. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 390 (discussing the advances in technology that render the
current legislation ineffective).
14. One author has explained server farms and data centers as such: "Put simply, a server is a
computer designed to provide information or processes to other computers on a network, and a
server farm, also known as a data center, is a group of servers in one location connected by a
network." Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International

Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 714 (2011).
15. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter Microsoft Case] ("[Companies like]
Microsoft store[] e-mail messages sent and received by its users in its datacenters.").
16. See id.; Kerr, supra note 8, at 406.
17. See MLAT: A Four-LetterWord in Need ofReform, ACCESSNOW (Jan. 9,2014,5:20 PM),
https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/01/09/mlat-a-four-letter-word-in-need-of-reform
(explaining
what an MLAT is and how it works). MLATs are treaties between two countries that allow each
nation to request help in the executing a search warrant when the subject is within the territory of
the other nation. See id.
18. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 475 (demonstrating that if a foreign country declines
to assist the United States in executing a search warrant, the electronic information will not
be accessible).
19. Id. at 471, 476.
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held that an SCA search warrant compelling Microsoft to produce a
customer's emails stored on a server in Ireland was enforceable.20 This
decision is likely to have a considerable impact on ISPs and the
American public because ISPs will now be compelled to share
information that was previously expected to be protected by the Fourth
Amendment.21 Up to one half of the world's population could be
affected by the potential ramifications of the SCA and the potential
ability of the U.S. government to reach into the email accounts
of users worldwide.22 This decision has brought to light the
jurisdictional problems that the SCA presents in its current form.23
Moreover, the interpretation of the SCA in this decision may offend
well-settled principles regarding transnational law, treaties, and
international comity.24
This Note addresses some of the issues highlighted above which
have yet to be resolved by lawmakers. Part II of this Note describes how
the SCA, the Fourth Amendment, and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure work in conjunction with each other.25 Additionally, Part II
explores Congress's jurisdictional capabilities outside of the
United States.26 Part III then highlights some of the current
problems caused by the SCA and the Microsoft Case, which
recently addressed many of them.2 7 Finally, Part IV proposes

20. Id. at 467, 471, 477 (stating that a search warrant issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)
maintains a special status as a hybrid between a subpoena and a search warrant); see also SDNY
Judge Orders Microsoft to Produce Emails Stored Abroad, BRACEWELL (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.bracewellgiuliani.com/news-publications/updates/sdny-judge-orders-microsoft-produceemails-stored-abroad (expounding upon the parties' arguments and Magistrate Judge Francis's
decision).
21. See SDNY Judge Orders Microsoft to Produce Emails Stored Abroad, supra note 20
(explaining that Microsoft cautioned against the "judicial approval of this type of seizure" because it
"could be met with potential backlash from the international community" since "the records [that
the] DOJ sought were personal, third-party emails where the international customer had a
reasonable expectation of privacy and not Microsoft's business records").
22. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 467; supranote 3 and accompanying text.
23. See Microsoft Case, supranote 15, at 467,470.
24. See infra Part II.C-D. Comity "refers both to legal policies that energize the rules of
conflict of laws and to considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining
amicable and workable relationships between nations." Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing and
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMp. L. 579, 589 (1983); see also Hartford Fire Ins. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to "prescriptive comity" as
the respect afforded to foreign sovereignties by limiting the reach of the laws of the United States).
25. See infra Part l.A-B.
26. See infra Part I.C.
27. See infra Part IL.
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legislative reform, as well as a two-prong test, which judges can use to
determine if a warrant should have extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 8
II.

THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, FOURTH AMENDMENT, AND
OTHER POTENTIAL PROTECTIONS

While the insufficiencies of the SCA are not recent discoveries,2 9
the decision in the Microsoft Case, discussing the jurisdictional reach of
the SCA, demonstrated the statute's flaws on an international scale.3 0
This Part introduces the history leading up to the enactment of the SCA
and the statute itself. 3 This Part also discusses legal doctrines and
procedures that work in conjunction with the SCA.32
A.

The Stored CommunicationsAct

The SCA is Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 ("ECPA"). The ECPA was enacted "to protect against the
unauthorized interception of electronic communications" 3 4 and to
provide additional privacy rights in electronic communications." The
SCA specifically applies to third-party electronic communication service
providers and prohibits them from sharing any of their customers' stored
electronic communications.3 6 Thus, the statute prohibits companies like

28.

See infra Part IV.

29. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 12, at 1233. For years, academics have highlighted some
problems that arise under the SCA, ranging from its lack of privacy protection to its outdated
terminology. For further discussion on these issues, see Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law
Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1395 n.121 (2004), and Kerr, supra note
12, at 1233.
30. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 466, 475-76; infra Part III.A.
31. See infra Part I.A.
32. See infra Part II.B-C.
33. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1986);
see also ElectronicCommunications PrivacyAct of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U S.C. § 2510-22, JUST. INFO.
SHARING, https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1285 (last updated July 30, 2013)
(explaining that the SCA is one of three different titles in the ECPA).
34. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986).
35. Id. at 1-3. In this report, Congress acknowledged that stored communications needed
additional safeguards that were not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 3; see also Bellia,
supra note 29, at 1396-97, 1413 (explaining that Congress enacted the SCA to protect electronic
information that was not previously protected by the Fourth Amendment).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) ("[A] provider of remote
computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly divulge a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or a customer of such service ... to any
governmental entity."). Emails stored on an ISP's server that have not been opened yet are
considered to be in storage. Mark D. Young, Electronic Surveillance in an Era of Modern
Technology & Evolving Threats to National Security, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 11, 18 (2011).
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Yahoo or Google from sharing a user's stored emails.3 7 The SCA
was enacted as a response to the public's ever-increasing use of
electronic communications, which were not adequately protected by the
Fourth Amendment."
The Fourth Amendment traditionally protects individuals from
warrantless searches and seizures; however, the sphere of protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily extend to
documents stored in cyberspace." Thus, the SCA was enacted to address
the gaps in traditional Fourth Amendment interpretations by creating
privacy protections for users of electronic communications.40
Additionally, parts of the SCA were enacted to help law enforcement
officers obtain electronically stored information during criminal
investigations.4 1 Under § 2703 of the SCA, law enforcement officers
may request electronically stored information from the ISP that holds
it.4 2 This can be done with an administrative subpoena, a court order, or
a warrant.4 3 Depending on how the information is requested, the
prerequisites necessary to obtain the information and records that must
be disclosed in reply will vary.44
1. Administrative Subpoenas
An administrative subpoena can compel an ISP to reveal limited
non-content information pursuant to the SCA.45 Issuing a subpoena
requires authorization by a federal or state grand jury, trial subpoena, or
37. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 383 (explaining that the SCA provides privacy protections to
email users).
38. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1-3; Kerr, supra note 12, at 1212. The SCA is the government's
attempt to fill the holes left in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and to protect network account
holders' privacy rights. See id.
39. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1209-10 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment protects
individuals from an unreasonable search of physical spaces such as our homes, papers, and other
tangible items, but not necessarily of our "virtual homes"); see also S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3
(explaining the law's general need for clarity, reform, and added protections due to evolving
technology).
40. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1212-13.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving Telecommunications
SurveillanceLaw, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 287, 298-99 (2008) (noting that an SCA warrant can be issued
for any criminal investigation, not just "a set of predicate offenses").
42. § 2703(a).
43. § 2703(b)(1)(A), (B)(i)-(ii).
44. § 2703(a)-(d); see infra Part II.A.1-3 (explaining, in detail, the requirements to obtain
each instrument and the records that must be disclosed).
45. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i), (c)(2). Generally speaking, agencies have the authority to issue
subpoenas in furtherance of investigations and adjudicative matters. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 33321, ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENAS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS: A
BRIEF LEGAL ANALYSIS 6 (2006).
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statute.46 The SCA does not impose any additional requirements to
obtain a subpoena beyond the usual standards that administrative
agencies and law enforcement officers follow. 4 7 Further, the scope of the
subpoena must only be reasonable to avoid Fourth Amendment
challenges. 48 Agencies may send subpoena requests to any person or
entity holding relevant information.4 9
Once a subpoena is issued for an account, the ISP is obligated to
disclose the name, address, Internet Protocol connection records, and
payment information used in connection with that account.so An
administrative subpoena may also compel the production of any
unopened emails that are more than 180 days old," as well as any
opened emails irrespective of how old they are.52 Law enforcement
officers do not need to give any prior notice to account holders when
requesting these records from the ISP. It is also possible for a subpoena
to compel disclosure of the "contents" of electronically stored
information.54 This has been interpreted to mean that a subpoena can
compel an ISP to disclose the information in both the subject line and
the body of an email." However, when a subpoena requests the
contents of the email, law enforcement officers shall give the account
holder prior notice.5 6

46. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).
47. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 469. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an
administrative agency and challenging parties are able to issue subpoenas to witnesses asking for
their cooperation in pending suits. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (2012).
48. DOYLE, supra note 45, at 9. This standard usually requires the following elements to be
satisfied: (1) the investigation has a legitimate purpose; (2) the subpoena does not violate the terms
of the agency's authorizing statute; (3) the requested documents are relevant to the investigation; (4)
the agency has not already obtained the information being sought; and (5) the subpoena will not be
an abuse of the court's process. See id. at 10.
49. § 555(d). Where the proceeding is for enforcement, the court will order the witness to
appear or produce the requested evidence. Id.
50. § 2703(c)(2); Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 468.
51. § 2703(a); Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at468.
52. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i); Microsoft Case, supranote 15, at 468-69, 469 n.2.
53. § 2703(c)(3) ("A governmental entity receiving records or information under this
subsection is not required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer.").
54. § 2703(a-b); see also Kerr, supra note 12, at 1228 (explaining that the SCA takes its
definition of "contents" from the Wiretap Act). The Wiretap Act defines "contents" as the
"substance" of the electronic communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012).
55. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 467. In this case, Magistrate Judge Francis explained
that emails include both non-content information and content information. Id. Information such as
the sender's email address, the recipient's email address, and the time and date that the email was
sent are considered non-content information. Id. Content information includes the words written in
the subject line of an email, as well as the message typed in the body of the email. Id.
56. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i); Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 469.
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2. Court Orders
A court order is another method of obtaining limited non-content
information and provides more information than an administrative
subpoena.57 If a law enforcement officer obtains a court order, the officer
is entitled to all of the information that is available under the subpoena,
as well as "record[s] or other information pertaining to a
subscriber. . . or customer."" This information includes historical logs
that reveal the email addresses with which a user has communicated. 9
Further, a law enforcement officer has a greater burden to meet when
seeking a court order than when seeking a subpoenao: the officer must
show that there are "specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents . .. are relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation." 6
3. Stored Communications Act Warrants
A search warrant pursuant to § 2703(a) of the SCA permits a law
enforcement officer to all information subject to production under both
administrative subpoena and court order, as well as the contents of any
unopened emails that are stored for less than 180 days.6 2 Further, law
enforcement officers are not required to give the account holder prior
notice that this information is being accessed.6 3 A warrant pursuant to
this section is often referred to as an "SCA warrant." 64 Since this method
reveals the most information, obtaining an SCA warrant imposes a much
greater burden on the government than in obtaining a subpoena or court
order." To obtain an SCA warrant, law enforcement officers must
follow the same protocol as for traditional search warrants under rule 41
of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure ("Rule 41"), which requires
officers to have probable cause.66
57.

Microsoft Case, supranote 15, at 469.

58. § 2703(c)(1)(B); Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 469.
59. Microsoft Case, supranote 15, at 469.
60. In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Servs.
to Disclose Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter In re Application of
the U.S.]; DOYLE, supra note 45, at 9. The law enforcement officer need not establish probable
cause, but the standard is higher than a subpoena. In re Application of the U.S., supra, at 314-15.
This intermediate burden of proof was implemented to protect against overzealous law enforcement
officers. Id.
61. § 2703(d); see also In re Application of the U.S., supra note 60, at 313 (denying that
§ 2703(d) requires proving probable cause and holding that a lower burden applies).
62.

Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470.

63. § 2703(b)(1)(A).
64. See, e.g., Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470.
65. See In re Application of the U.S., supra note 60, at 313.
66. § 2703(a); Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (mandating
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TraditionalSearches and Seizures in the United States

U.S. citizens have always relied upon the Fourth Amendment to
protect them from unreasonable government searches and seizures.6 7
Additionally, Rule 41 helps protect the public against unreasonable
intrusions by defining the prerequisites to obtain a search warrant.6 8
However, the Fourth Amendment needs to evolve in light of
developments in modern technology. 69
1. The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century
The Fourth Amendment7 o is a fundamental protection in the U.S.
Constitution that prohibits the government from unlawfully searching or
seizing information where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The framers of the Fourth Amendment sought to protect individuals'
intrusions.7 2
government
interests from unreasonable
privacy
Traditionally, this expectation of privacy has applied to physical places,
like our homes.73
However, once an individual willingly shares information with a
third party, the Fourth Amendment protections no longer apply. 74 This
that law enforcement officers demonstrate probable cause before a warrant will be issued); see also
In re Search of Yahoo, Inc., No. 07-3194-MB, 2007 WL 1539971, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007)
(concluding that Congress specifically intended that the procedures in Rule 41 for "obtaining and
issuing search warrants" apply to § 2703(a)).
67. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1209.
68. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41; infra Part II.B.2.
69. See infra Part II.B. 1.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. The Fourth Amendment can be bifurcated into two separate clauses: one protecting from
unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents and the other requiring probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant. Investigations and Police Practices, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
3, 3 (2009).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); see also MARK G. MILONE, INFORMATION SECURITY LAW § 10.01 (2016) (explaining
that there is no rigid rule to determine if someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy, but rather
a two-part test that considers subjective and objective expectations).
72. See MILONE, supra note 71, § 10.01; see also Investigations and Police Practices, supra
note 70, at 3 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures).
73. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1209; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 70, at 27
(explaining that a search warrant protects an individual against unjustified governmental intrusion
of his home and possessions, thereby preserving the individual's privacy interest).
74. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see also United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 438, 443 (1976) (holding that the government did not violate the defendant's Fourth
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distinction has become unclear with advancements in electronic
communications 75 because information is shared ipso facto with a third
party (the ISP) once stored on a server.7 6 Courts are just beginning to
consider whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when
communicating through an ISP. 77

2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41
Rule 41 provides the procedural requirements necessary to obtain a
search warrant." First, a neutral and impartial judge must have the
jurisdictional authority to issue a warrant in that district. Second, a
judge may only issue a warrant if the property to be searched and seized
is evidence, or the fruits, of a crime.so Third, there must be a nexus
between the property being seized and the criminal behavior under
investigation." Finally, a judge must determine whether probable
cause exists.82 Probable cause exists when there is a "reasonable
ground for belief of guilt"" or "suspect[ing] that a person has committed
or is committing a crime." 8 4 To determine if probable cause exists, a
judge will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding an

Amendment rights when it obtained financial documents from the defendant's bank because
defendant had voluntarily conveyed that information to a third party).
75. See In re U.S. for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail and for an Order Directing
a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Servs. to Not Disclose the Existence of the Search Warrant, 665 F.
Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Or. 2009) (describing that when a person accesses the Internet, the
information does not remain in the physical home, but rather remains on a server owned by ISPs,
complicating the application of the Fourth Amendment).
76. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1209-11 ("Our most private information ends up being sent to
private third parties and held far away on remote network servers.").
77. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that computer users do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they are sharing such information with system
operators); see also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 418 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (stating that once
an email is sent through a server, like America Online, the reasonable expectation of privacy may be
destroyed because of third-party access). But see State v. Reid, 914 A.2d 310, 313, 317 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2007) (holding that under the relevant state constitution, the defendant created a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her identity by use of an anonymous ISP account number).
78. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)-(e).
79.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b); Investigationsand PolicePractices,supra note 70, at 21-22.

80.
81.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(l)-(2); InvestigationsandPolice Practices,supra note 70, at 22.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).

82.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1); Investigationsand Police Practices,supra note 70, at 13.

83.

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).

84.

Probable Cause, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); cf Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) ("Articulating precisely what . . . 'probable cause' mean[s] is not possible.
[It is a] commonsense, nontechnical conception[] that deal[s] with 'the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."'
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983))).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 12

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

980

[Vol, 44:971

incident." There are no per se rules when deciding if probable cause
exists." Furthermore, it is a well-settled principle of law that
establishing probable cause requires a lesser showing than that required
to obtain a conviction.87
C.

ExtraterritorialJurisdiction

With the invention and evolution of email, questions arise regarding
the constitutional protections afforded to email account holders,
especially when emails are stored on data servers overseas.88 One
possibility is for courts to conclude that the SCA has extraterritorial
jurisdiction, meaning that the statute is applicable to conduct occurring
outside of the United States." Extraterritorial jurisdiction also allows the
United States to exercise jurisdiction over parties who are not physically
within the United States.90 However, there is a presumption that
Congress intends statutes to apply only to those within the United
States. 91 The Supreme Court has said that Congress should only legislate
extraterritorially if there is a reasonable basis for exercising jurisdiction
over the person or activity located outside the United States, and it

85.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31.

86.

Investigationsand Police Practices,supra note 70, at 24.

87. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175 (citing Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. 339, 348 (1813))
(explaining that the phrase probable cause, according to its common understanding, means less
evidence is required than is required for "condemnation").
88. Id.; see supra Part H.B.1; infra Part HI.A.
89. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also Swanson, supra
note 14, at 721 (debating whether a court could exercise jurisdiction over a server farm set on the
high seas). This is also known as legislative jurisdiction or the "jurisdiction to prescribe." Hartford
Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[I]t is settled
law .. .that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends . . . ."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 30(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a)
attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the conduct occurs or (b)
as to the status of a national or as to an interest of a national, wherever the thing or other subjectmatter to which the interest relates is located."). But see Swanson, supra note 14, at 721-22. In his
article, Swanson posits that law enforcement officers might be able to access the overseas servers
based on the idea that it connects to local computers within the territorial boundaries. Id.
91. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) ("Congress ordinarily
legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign, matters."); Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248
(holding that Congress must express its "affirmative intention" for the statute to have an
extraterritorial effect); see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007)
(reinforcing the idea that U.S. legislation "does not rule the world").
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should shy away from exercising jurisdiction in a way that might
interfere with another nation's sovereignty. 9 2
For a law enacted by Congress to affect those located outside U.S.
borders, a reviewing court must first determine that exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable. 93 If the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction is unreasonable, the inquiry ends there and
jurisdiction may not be exercised.94 Alternatively, if more than one
nation has a reasonable interest in exercising jurisdiction, the court must
decide which nation should exercise such jurisdiction. 5 A court or state
must determine which nation has a greater interest in regulating such
persons or activity. 96 Finally, if Congress does have jurisdiction to
regulate the matter, a court must then interpret the statute to decide the
underlying issue.97 To do so, a judge first looks at the plain meaning of
the language in the law." If the plain meaning of the language is clear
and unambiguous, the court has a duty to enforce that meaning. 99
However, if the language in the statute is ambiguous,'0 0 a judge may
92. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004) (stating that
U.S. laws should "avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations");
see also Hartford Fire Ins., 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Under the Restatement, a
nation having some 'basis' for jurisdiction to prescribe law should nonetheless refrain from
exercising that jurisdiction 'with respect to a person or activity having connections with another
state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."'). In HarfordFireInsurance, Justice
Scalia presented two important canons of statutory interpretation: (1) unless Congress shows
otherwise, its legislation is only meant to apply within the United States; and (2) a legislative act
should not be interpreted in such a way that it will violate the laws of another country, if there is any
other possible interpretation available. HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403

(AM. LAW INST. 1987). Whether jurisdiction is unreasonable will be determined by many factors,
including the relation of the activity to the territory trying to assert jurisdiction, the nationality or
relation of nationality between the state and the person responsible for the activity, the importance
of regulation to the state, and the likelihood of creating conflict with another state when exercising
jurisdiction. Id. Section 403(3) of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States explains that when it is not unreasonable for two states to exercise jurisdiction, but
both exercising jurisdiction would cause conflict, each state has an obligation to measure its own
interest in exercising jurisdiction against the other state's interest. Id. The state should defer to the
other if the other state's interest is clearly greater. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. HartfordFireIns., 509 U.S. at 821 (Scalia, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403.

Applying such test is also referred to as a

"conflict-of-laws analysis." HartfordFireIns., 509 U.S. at 821 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
98. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (stating that
courts must enforce the plain meaning of the statute's language unless such interpretation would
produce an "absurd" result).
99. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,438 (1999).
100. Statutory language "is ambiguous if it is 'capable of being understood in two or more
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look toward legislative history or canons of interpretation to determine if
Congress intended the statute to have extraterritorial jurisdiction.o
III.

THE FLAWS OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

While the SCA was innovative when enacted, it has become clear
that it no longer sufficiently safeguards Fourth Amendment privacy
rights in the twenty-first century.1 0 2 Technology has advanced while the
statute, which still uses outdated technological terms from 1986, has
not.' 03 Further, many issues have arisen since the SCA's enactment, such
as debates over its jurisdictional reach, questions about its interaction
with existing law, and confusion over textual ambiguities. 104 The statute,
in its current form, is wildly complex and needs legislative reform. 0 s
Professor Orin Kerr has pointed out as follows:
The SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the privacy of
stored Internet communications; instead it is narrowly tailored to
provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like protections for computer
networks. Unfortunately, some judges have had a difficult time
realizing this, and have twisted the statute to do things that it was never
106
intended to do.

Since the statute is difficult to construe, judges have had contradicting
interpretations of the SCA, resulting in a lack of uniformity regarding
the statute's applicability.107 The Microsoft Case, which was
recently decided in the Southern District of New York, discussed

possible senses or ways."' In re U.S. for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail and for an
Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Servs. to Not Disclose the Existence of the Search
Warrant, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1216 (D. Or. 2009) (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. United States,
534 U.S. 84, 90 (1992)).
101. See Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94 (explaining that canons of statutory interpretation
"are designed to help judges determine the Legislature's intent as embodied in particular statutory
language"). But see Boureslan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 857 F.2d 1014, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1988)
(explaining that courts shall not substitute legislative history for the language of the statute).
102. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1233-34.
103. Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 821 (2003) (explaining how the SCA
uses technology terms of the 1980s and that this increases the difficulty in interpreting it). The
terminology is now largely outdated when applied to mass storage of data by ISPs. See id. at 821.
104. See infra Part U1.A-D.
105. See Kerr, supra note 12, at 1233.
106. Id. at 1214.
107. Compare Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 472, 474, with Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C08-1068, 2009 WL 4430297, at *3, *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009) (stating that the ECPA does not
express any Congressional intent for extraterritorial application and, therefore, does not apply
outside of the United States).
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some of these issues and showed many of the deficiencies of the SCA
in its current form.108

A.

The Microsoft Case

Magistrate Judge James C. Francis, presiding in the Southern
District of New York, recently issued a search warrant compelling
Microsoft to release a customer's emails stored on a server in Dublin,
Ireland.1 09 Microsoft partially complied by releasing a limited amount of
non-content information stored within the United States, but it refused to
share information stored on its server in Ireland."o In objecting,
Microsoft posited that a search occurs where the information is stored,
not where it is viewed."' This theory was also consistent with
Microsoft's contention that an SCA warrant is more like a traditional
search warrant and should be executed in strict accordance with the
Rule 41 warrant requirements." 2 Based on Microsoft's arguments, SCA
warrants would not have their own extraterritorial jurisdictional basis
and would thus need to be enforced with the help of an MLAT."'
In his analysis, Magistrate Judge Francis largely rejected
Microsoft's position.' 14 He began by interpreting the language of the
statute,' ' where he found an ambiguity on its face."' He explained that
the statute "is ambiguous in at least one critical respect.""' The
language in the statute that refers to Rule 41 could be read consistently
with Microsoft's interpretation of the statute, which would mean the
warrant lacks any extraterritorial effect.' However, the language could
also be read to mean that Rule 41 provides the procedural mechanisms
108.

See infra Part III.A.

109.
110.
111.

SDNY Judge OrdersMicrosoft to ProduceEmails StoredAbroad, supranote 20.
Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 468.
Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Provider to Disclose Data

Stored Abroad?, CDT (July 30, 2014), https://cdt.org/insight/microsoft-ireland-case-can-a-uswarrant-compel-a-us-provider-to-disclose-data-stored-abroad (comparing the government and
Microsoft's contradicting views of where a search occurs).
112. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470.
113. Id at 470, 474; Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Provider to
Disclose DataStoredAbroad?, supranote 111.

114. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470,474.
115. Id. at 470. This makes sense since courts should only turn to legislative intent and other
methods of interpreting the meaning of a statute if the statute's language is ambiguous. See
Boureslan v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 857 F.2d 1014,1018-19 (5th Cir. 1988).
116. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470. Magistrate Judge Francis found the ambiguity to be
encapsulated in the phrase "using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure." Id
117. Id.
118. Id.
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necessary for an SCA warrant, but the warrant takes its substantive rules
from elsewhere."19
To clarify this ambiguity, Magistrate Judge Francis turned to the
policy reasons behind the SCA's enactment.' 2 0 After describing the lack
of protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment, he quickly arrived at
the conclusion that a warrant issued under § 2703(a) "is a hybrid: part
search warrant and part subpoena."' 2' The hybrid nature of an SCA
warrant is due to the fact that law enforcement officers apply for it like
they would a regular search warrant under Rule 41,122 yet it "is executed
like a subpoena in that it is served on the ISP in possession of the
information and does not involve government agents entering the
premises of the ISP to search its servers and seize the email[s]."n
Next, Magistrate Judge Francis addressed some of the "scant"
legislative history surrounding the enactment of both the ECPA and the
SCA.1 24 For support, he relied on a Senate report on the ECPA
discussing the massive amounts of data already stored by remote thirdparty operators in 1986.125 He suggested that although Congress did not
specifically discuss the idea of extraterritoriality, the awareness of
remote third-party operators in 1986 "reflected an understanding that
information was being maintained remotely by third-party entities." 26
Magistrate Judge Francis then turned to the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of
119. Id.; see, e.g., In re U.S. for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail and for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Servs. to Not Disclose the Existence of the Search Warrant,
665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1219 (D. Or. 2009) (explaining that the ambiguity in the term "issued" could
be interpreted as limiting the procedures available under § 2703(a) or could have been used as a
"shorthand for the process of obtaining, issuing, executing, and returning a warrant, as described in
Rule 41").
120. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 471.
121. Id. Magistrate Judge Francis's characterization of an SCA warrant as a hybrid is similar to
Professor Kerr's description of a § 2703(d) court order:
[A §] 2703(d) order . .. is something like a mix between a subpoena and a search
warrant. To obtain the order, the government must provide specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the information to be
compelled is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
Kerr, supra note 12, at 1219.
122. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 471.
123. Id. What is peculiar about this interpretation is that nowhere in § 2703(a) does the statute
refer to the warrant as a subpoena or a subpoena-like warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
124. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 472.
125. Id. at 472-73 (quoting S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986)).
126. Id. at 472. While this Senate report very well may reflect an understanding of remote
third-party entities, there is no evidence to support the idea that the Senate meant to subject foreign
third-party entities to this statute's jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/12

14

La Marca: I Got 99 Problems and a Warrant Is One: How Current Interpretatio

2016]

I GOT 99 PROBLEMS AND A WARRANT IS ONE

985

2001 ("Patriot Act")' 27 to support the idea that information is located at
an ISP's headquarters, "not the location of any server." 2 8 The Patriot
Act allows for cross-jurisdictional warrants within the United States.1 2 9
Therefore, Magistrate Judge Francis's interpretation makes the massive
amounts of data stored around the world subject to the jurisdiction of an
ISP's headquarters.' 30 Under this reading, any email account that uses an
ISP headquartered in the United States would be subject to an SCA
warrant regardless of whether the account holder is personally subject to
the warrant."I
Nevertheless, Magistrate Judge Francis misinterpreted the exact
passage that he used to support this theory. 13 2 The Patriot Act
simply allows for property located within the United States to be more
easily accessible pursuant to a warrant.' 33 Furthermore, the Patriot Act
specifically states that the SCA still requires a search warrant.13 4 It does
not, in any way, amend the warrant requirement of the SCA.' 3 5 Even if it
did, the Patriot Act was enacted to protect against terrorism after the
attacks of September 11, 2001."6 Conversely, the investigation in the
Microsoft Case involved narcotics trafficking, which does not
necessarily have the same implications for national security.' 37

127. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
128. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 473-74. One reason to follow this line of thinking is
that many of the large ISPs, like AOL and Yahoo, are located within the same jurisdictions,
heavily burdening certain courts. Id at 474 (citing Bellia, supra note 29, at 1454). This notion might
be sensible when examined in a national context, but not necessarily in an international one. See id
at 474.
129. Id. at 473.
130. See id. at 474.
131. See id. at 473-74.
132. See id.; H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1, at 57 (2001) ("18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) requires a search
warrant to compel service providers to disclose unopened e-mails. This section does not affect the
requirementfor a search warrant, but rather attempts to address the investigative delays caused by
the cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet.").
133. See H.R. REP. No. 107-236, at 57. The example used in the House of Representative's
report demonstrates the ease with which law enforcement officers located in Boston seeking
information located in California can obtain a "cross-jurisdictional warrant." Id This Congressional
report does not allude to an international search warrant. See id.
134. See id.
135. H.R. REP. No. 107-236, at 57.
136. MICHEL E. BELEC ET AL., 703 THE EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF THE US PATRIOT
ACT & ITS EFFECT ON CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS 4 (Ass'N CORP. COUNSEL 2006).

137. See The Editorial Board, Adapting Old Laws to New Technologies, N.Y. TIMES
(July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/opinion/Must-Microsoft-Turn-Over-Emailson-Irish-Servers.html.
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Finally, Magistrate Judge Francis found that a search and seizure
does not occur until a person actually views the information.
Accordingly, in this case, there was no unconstitutional extraterritorial
search since the information was viewed in the United States.1 3 8
Magistrate Judge Francis's interpretation is flawed and could create a
slippery slope concerning SCA warrants and data stored
internationally. 13 9 His holding allows the government to circumvent the
necessary and obligatory procedures set forth in an MLAT.' 4 0 Avoiding
the MLAT procedures offends international comity and sends a
disrespectful message to foreign officials that U.S. law enforcement
officers will execute the law as they see fit, regardless of any preexisting
diplomatic agreements.14 1 To justify his interpretation, Magistrate Judge
Francis asserted that if the United States were to comply with the MLAT
procedures, some information would be entirely outside the reach of
U.S. law enforcement, and thus, the SCA must enjoy an extraterritorial
application.' 4 2 However, he failed to consider concepts like the
"protective principle ofjurisdiction."'4 3
Most importantly, in his opinion, Magistrate Judge Francis
interpreted the SCA in a manner that offends the Fourth Amendment."
Generally, a federal statute should not supersede the protections afforded

138. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at472.
139. See Microsoft 'Must Release' Data Held On Dublin Server, BBC (Apr. 29, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27191500 (discussing a European official's unhappiness with
the holding of the Microsoft case because it allows for access "outside [the] formal channels of
[international] co-operation").
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 474-75. To bolster this statement, Magistrate Judge
Francis mentioned that Google supposedly looked into developing server farms located in
international waters, where no country has jurisdiction. Id. at 475.
143. See United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 777 (N.D. Cal. 1992). The protective
principle is a constitutional basis to exert jurisdiction over a defendant located in international
waters. Id. To exercise jurisdiction over a person or entity under this principle, there must be a
"constitutionally sufficient nexus" between the defendant's conduct and the United States. Id.; see
also Jennifer J. Berthiaume, United States v. Juda: Fifih Amendment Due Process and Stateless

Vessels On The High Seas, 73 B.U. L. REv. 477, 480 (1993) (explaining that the protective principle
"allows a nation to prosecute certain offenses committed outside its territory if these offenses
threaten national security or otherwise interfere with governmental functions").
144. See Microsoft's Objections to the Magistrate's Order Denying Microsoft's Motion to
Vacate in Part a Search Warrant Seeking Customer Information Located Outside the United States,
supranote 4, at 3-4.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/12

16

La Marca: I Got 99 Problems and a Warrant Is One: How Current Interpretatio

I GOT 99 PROBLEMS AND A WARRANT IS ONE

2016]

987

by the Constitution.14 5 In fact, "[i]t would be manifestly contrary
to the objectives" of the Constitution to interpret the Supremacy Clause
as allowing Congress to enact laws without any regard for it.146
Magistrate Judge Francis disregarded certain qualities in the
SCA that suggest that an SCA warrant is meant to act like a
typical search warrant.147 The first indication that § 2703(a) should
be interpreted as a traditional search warrant is that the statute uses
the word "warrant" in conjunction with the procedures described
148
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
However, rather
than erring on the side of caution, Magistrate Judge Francis
implied, through his interpretation of the SCA, that the government
may impinge on the constitutional protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment by allowing what appears to be a traditional search
warrant to be executed extraterritorially.14 9
B.

The Location of a Search or Seizure Under the
Stored Communications Act

Some ISPs, like Microsoft, delete nearly all of the data from their
servers in the United States once the information is securely stored in a
foreign server.so Nevertheless, this information can easily be retrieved
and viewed within the United States with minimal search efforts."' This
brings up a second issue with the SCA-determining where a search and
seizure actually occurs when the subject of the warrant is information
stored in cyberspace.152

145. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land . . . ."); see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (holding a federal statute can never supersede the Constitution).
146. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
148. See id.
149.

See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 471-72, 474.

150. Id. at 467.
151. Id. at 468.
152.

See Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Provider to Disclose Data

Stored Abroad?, supra note 11. But see In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (holding that there are actually two searches
when dealing with computers-searching for the computer and searching the information stored on
the computer).
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One possible theory is that the search and seizure occurs where the
data is physically stored.' If this is correct, then U.S. law enforcement
officers would need to ensure that an SCA warrant is issued within the
correct jurisdiction. 5 4 Under this theory, whether Congress intended for
the SCA to have extraterritorial jurisdiction is critical.'"I Another theory
is that the search and seizure occurs only where law enforcement
officers view the information on the computer screen.s' A final theory is
that information is searched and seized not where it is stored or viewed
but where the person who controls the information is located."' In fact,
there is case law suggesting that the "test for production of documents is
control, not location,"' but this precedent is based on subpoenas and
not search warrants.' 5 9
C.

ExtraterritorialEffects of the Stored Communication
Act's Interpretation

The language of the SCA does not address congressional intent on
whether the statute has an extraterritorial reach.1 6 0 The statute reads
as follows:
A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communication service of the contents of a wire or
electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days
or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures
153. See Microsoft IrelandCase: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Providerto Disclose Data
Stored Abroad?, supra note 111.
154. See, e.g., id This will only become an issue when a warrant is seeking to compel
information that is stored outside the teritorial jurisdiction of the United States, since the Patriot
Act allows judges to issue warrants compelling information that is stored outside a judge's district
but within the Untied States. Let the Sun Set on PATRIOT-Section 220: "Nationwide Service of
Search Warrants for Electronic Evidence," ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://w2.eff.org/
patriot/sunset/220.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
155. See infra Part HI.C.
156. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REv. 531, 551
(2005).
157. Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Provider to Disclose Data
Stored Abroad?, supra note 111.
158. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 472 (quoting Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707
F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983)).
159. Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d at 667; Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143, 147
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("[F]or the purposes of a Rule 45 subpoena, a document is within a witness's
'possession, custody, or control' if the witness has the practical ability to obtain the document."). If
Magistrate Judge Francis's interpretation that the SCA warrant substantively acts like a subpoena is
accepted, this control test will be the governing standard. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 472.
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
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described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure .. . by a court of
competent jurisdiction.16 1
Scholars,1 6 2 attorneys,' 6' and judges'" alike have debated whether
Congress intended to create a warrant executed pursuant to Rule 41 or a
warrant executed like a subpoena with this language.1 65 Though the plain
meaning and congressional intent are key in deciding whether a statute
has extraterritorial jurisdiction,1 6 6 there is little case law regarding the
potential extraterritorial reach of an SCA warrant.' 67 How the statute is
interpreted greatly impacts just how much jurisdictional power the
warrant gives law enforcement officials.' 68
1. A Stored Communications Act Warrant as Substantively Like a
Traditional Search Warrant
It is well-established that judges do not have the statutory authority
to issue warrants for foreign searches and seizures. 16 9 If Congress
intended for an SCA warrant to be exercised as a traditional search

16 1. Id.
162.

Recent Case, Privacy Law-Stored Communications Act-District Court Holds that SCA

Warrant Obligates US. Providerto Produce Emails Stored on ForeignServers.-In re Warrant to
Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 128 HARv. L. REV.
1019, 1023 (2015).
163. Reply Memorandum in Support of Microsoft's Motion to Vacate in Part an SCA Warrant
Seeking Customer Information Located Outside the United States at 1-2, In re Warrant to Search a
Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained By Microsoft Corp., 2014 WL 4629624
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014) (No. 13-MJ-2814).
164. Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 471. Professor Orin Kerr also notes the seeming
inconsistency of the Eighth Circuit's actions in one case, where the court seemed to profess the
standard of a warrant but apply the standard for a subpoena instead. Kerr, supra note 12, at 1211
n.18.
165.

Microsoft Case, supranote 15, at 470-71.

166. See supra Part II.C.
167.

SDNY Judge Orders Microsoft to Produce Emails Stored Abroad, supra note 20

(explaining that the Microsoft Case is the first case to decide on the application of a U.S. search
warrant for data stored abroad); see also Zheng v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C-08-1068, 2009 WL 4430297,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2009) (stating that no other court had considered whether the ECPA applied
extraterritorially prior to that point).
168. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 468. Also, for the purposes of this section, when
referring to a traditional search warrant, it is assumed that that the search occurs where the data is
physically stored.
169. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 275 & n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining
there are no statutory provisions that govern or provide for extraterritorial warrants); see also Reply
Memorandum in Support of Microsoft's Motion to Vacate in Part an SCA Warrant Seeking
Customer Information Located Outside the United States, supra note 163, at 1-2 (highlighting the
fact that there are no U.S. cases interpreting an SCA warrant to be executed like a subpoena).
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warrant, the warrant cannot have extraterritorial jurisdiction because
Rule 41 does not include such language. 170 Using accepted methods of
statutory interpretation, it seems clear that such information is accessible
strictly through the use of a traditional search warrant."' Support for this
theory is directly in the statute, which states that emails in storage for
less than 180 days are accessible "only pursuant to a warrant issued
using the procedures described" in Rule 4 1.172
Congress specifically used the term "warrant," rather than
subpoena, in the statute and did not suggest any alternative
interpretations of this word."' Nor is there any legislative history
suggesting that Congress intended for a warrant to act like a subpoena.1 74
Additionally, such information is accessible "only" pursuant to a
warrant, indicating that there is no other method to obtain the
information.1 75 If Congress did not intend for an SCA warrant to reach
into other sovereignties, there would be greater incentive for companies
to begin storing larger amounts, or even all, of their data in less
restrictive countries overseas, knowing that the information is outside
the immediate reach of U.S. law enforcement officers.7 6 The
information would not be completely inaccessible, however, given that
law enforcement officers may also rely on MLATs. 7 1

170. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (lacking language specifically granting extraterritorial
jurisdiction).
171. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
173. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Microsoft's Motion to Vacate in Part an SCA
Warrant Seeking Customer Information Located Outside the United States, supranote 163, at 1.
174. See H.R. REP. No. 107-236, pt. 1, at 57 (2001). In its report, the House of Representatives
committee specifically stated: "Title 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) requires a search warrant to compel
service providers to disclose unopened emails." Id. (emphasis added). The committee then
explained that the Patriot Act was not intended to affect the search warrant requirement of the SCA;
it was merely meant to decrease the time it previously took to obtain a warrant. Id.
175.

See

§ 2703(a);

Only, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1577 (1993)

(defining "only" as "just the one simple thing and nothing more or different"). Under the common
understanding of the word "only," it appears as though a search warrant is the sole manner in which
the information is accessible under the SCA. See § 2703(a); Only, supra.
176. See Shamoil T. Shipchandler, Really Strange Bedfellows, BRACEWELL (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://www.bracewelllaw.com/blog/2014/08/05/really-strange-bedfellows.
177. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 474; see also infra Part UL.D (discussing procedures
for executing a search warrant through the use of an MLAT and the complications that may arise).
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2. A Stored Communications Act Warrant as Substantively Like
a Subpoena
An alternative interpretation of the SCA is that an SCA warrant is
meant to substantively act like a subpoena, with Rule 41 as simply the
procedural vehicle to obtain the SCA warrant.178 If this is the case, then
when a person or entity is served with an SCA warrant, the test for
compelling information under a subpoena would apply.1 7 9 The requested
documents would have to be produced regardless of their location, so
long as they were under the control of the person or entity served with
the SCA warrant.' This theory would increase the government's access
to data stored overseas since many ISPs are headquartered in the United
States and are therefore within its jurisdiction."'
When an SCA warrant is sent to an ISP, no law enforcement
officers are physically present at the ISP's location to seize the
information as there would be in a traditional search warrant scenario. 18 2
This supports the argument that an SCA warrant substantively behaves
differently than a traditional search warrant by differentiating the
characteristics between the two.' 83 If Congress intended for the SCA
warrant to be interpreted this way, then the government would not be

178.

Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 470; see also In re Search of Yahoo, Inc., No. 07-3194-

MB, 2007 WL 1539971, at *5 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007) (interpreting statutory amendments to mean
Rule 41 should be applied to things that are procedural in nature). In In re Search of Yahoo, Judge
Anderson first acknowledged that § 2703(a) used to read that a warrant under that section was valid
pursuant to "a warrant 'under' the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. at *6. However, after the
enactment of the Patriot Act, the language was changed so that a warrant is valid when issued
"using the procedures described in" Rule 41. Id. at *5-6. Judge Anderson explained that the
amendment created an ambiguity that lends itself to two reasonable conclusions: that all provisions
of Rule 41 apply unconditionally or that Rule 41 only applies to the provisions of § 2703(a) that are
procedural in nature. Id at *5. By turning to the dictionary and common understandings of the word
"procedure," Judge Anderson eventually concluded that Rule 41 only governs the procedural
provisions of § 2703(a). Id.
179.

See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 472.

180. See id. (quoting Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1983));
Govemment's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Microsoft's Motion to Vacate Email Account
Warrant at 10, In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained By
Microsoft Corp., 2014 WL 4629624 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2014) (No. 13-MJ-2814) ("The compelled
disclosure provisions set forth in § 2703 of the SCA do not alter the settled rule that a party located
in the United States properly served with a compulsory demand for information as part of a federal
criminal investigation is required to produce all responsive records within that party's possession,
custody or control, regardless of where those records are located.").
181. See Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d at 667. If the court has personal jurisdiction over the
person or entity served, they will be able to "enforce obedience to . . . [a] subpoena." Id.
182.

See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 471.

183. See id.
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overstepping any jurisdictional boundaries or interfering with another
nation's sovereignty because it would not be conducting an
extraterritorial search and seizure. Rather, it would simply be compelling
the production of information from a U.S. company pursuant to a
subpoena. 184 Unfortunately, if this interpretation is accepted, the U.S.
government would be infringing upon the comity owed to foreign
nations18 by essentially using the SCA warrant as a loophole to avoid
well-established procedures and ratified MLATs. '"
D.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treatiesand the
Stored Communications Act

If an SCA warrant is not considered to substantively act like a
subpoena, but rather like a warrant, then U.S. law enforcement officers
have no choice but to turn to foreign nations for assistance in obtaining
needed information.187 An MLAT allows two countries to reciprocally
"gather and exchange evidence and information to enforce public or
criminal laws.""8 8 While MLATs can certainly be helpful in procuring
information, they also force U.S. federal law enforcement to depend on
foreign law enforcement to ensure compliance with U.S. statutes in
foreign territories.' 89 Generally, U.S. law enforcement officers "have no
authority to conduct investigations, arrests, or seizures on their own
beyond U.S. territorial limits."'
Furthermore, the foreign country typically has some discretion as to
whether a U.S. search warrant should be honored."' If providing
assistance would conflict with some essential public or national interest,
then a party to an MLAT need not comply with a search warrant
assistance request.' 92 For example, in the Microsoft Case discussed
earlier,' 93 complying with the U.S. search warrant may have led to a

184.
185.
186.
187.

See id at 472.
See Shipchandler,supra note 176.
See id.
Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 474.

188. Amy E. Pope, Lawlessness Breeds Lawlessness: A Case for Applying the Fourth
Amendment to ExtraterritorialSearches, 65 FLA. L. REv. 1917, 1931 (2013).

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id
Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 474.
Id. at 474-75.
See supra Part III.A.
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violation of the Irish Data Protection Acts and the EU Data Protection
Directive.' 94 This would give Ireland a reason to refuse to comply with
the MLAT or help the United States execute a search warrant, since
executing the warrant would violate one if its own laws.' 95
MLATs reinforce the principle of international comity.1 9 If SCA
warrants that indirectly allow for extraterritorial searches and seizures
are enforced, then law enforcement could simply use a U.S. statute to
avoid existing treaty obligations, which begs the question of why the
United States enters into MLATs in the first place.' 97 Since there is a
presumption that a nation will not exercise its jurisdiction in a way that
interferes with the sovereignty of another nation,"9 s this interpretation
flies in the face of existing treaties, international comity, and
maintaining cordial relations with foreign nations.' 99 In fact, European
leaders have already admitted that they have concerns about the potential
reach of SCA warrants following the decision in the Microsoft Case.200
IV.

MODERNIZING THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT TO REFLECT
THE "SHRINKING" WORLD

The evolution of technology has prompted some to say that the
world is shrinking.2 0' While the conveniences and luxuries of electronic
communication are enjoyed by many, the laws protecting the privacy of
these relatively new methods of communication usually lag years, or
even decades, behind how technology operates.202 The SCA is in

194. Mary Minihan, Microsoft Data Case May Have 'Very Serious' Implications-Minister
Dana Murphy Says Ruling Could Create Legal Uncertaintyfor Consumers and Companies, IRISH

TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/microsoft-data-case-may-havevery-serious-implications-minister-1.1916834.
195. See JOSEPH BIDEN, MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATIES wrTH BELIZE, INDIA,
IRELAND, AND LIECHTENSTEIN, S. EXEC. REP. No. 107-15, at 3 (2002).

196. See id; see also Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to "prescriptive comity" as the respect afforded to foreign sovereignties by
limiting the reach of the laws of the United States).
197. See Shipchandler, supra note 176.
198. See HarfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). A court will presume that a
statute affords prescriptive comity to foreign nations because the court presumes that Congress
exercises prescriptive comity when enacting laws. Id.; see supra Part I.C.
199. See, e.g., Minihan, supra note 194.
200. See, e.g., Microsoft 'Must Release'DataHeld On Dublin Server, supra note 139.
201. See Rodger Dean Duncan, Innovation: Expanding Horizons While Shrinking the World,
FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014, 1:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rodgerdeanduncan/2014/
04/15/innovation-expanding-horizons-while-shrinking-the-world. The ease with which we travel
and communicate makes the world metaphorically feel like a smaller place. Id.
202. See Bellia, supranote 29, at 1385-88, 1396-97.
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desperate need of reform, not only because of its outdated understanding
of technology203 but also because of its potential for unauthorized
extraterritorial application.204
This Part suggests that the law should be reformed in a way that
allows law enforcement agencies to obtain the information they seek,
while safeguarding fundamental constitutional protections. 205 First, this
Part explains whether the SCA warrant should be interpreted to be
substantively more like a subpoena or a traditional search warrant. 206 It
also addresses the dilemma of determining where the actual search and
seizure occurs.207 Second, this Part affirms the importance of MLATs
and suggests reinforcing the use of MLATs when they exist by
specifically mentioning them in the SCA.208 Third, this Part explains
how incorporating a jurisdictional balancing test when determining
whether to execute an SCA warrant in a foreign country will help honor
international comity on a macro level. 209 Finally, this Part applies the
"minimum contacts" test on a micro level to the person or entity whose
information is being sought by the government, as to ensure that the
government is not overstepping their jurisdictional boundaries.210
A.

Stored CommunicationsAct WarrantsShould Be Classifiedas
Search Warrantsand the Search Should Be Deemed to
Occur Where the Data Is Located

Before any analysis or solution can be posited, it must first be
established that an SCA warrant should not be classified as a subpoena
or any form of "hybrid." 2 1 1 If Congress intended for the SCA warrant to
substantively act as a subpoena, then it should amend the language of the
statute to reflect that purpose.2 12 Instead, it seems more likely, based on
the plain language of the statute, that Congress intended for the SCA
warrant to be executed as a traditional Rule 41 search warrant.2 13

203. Reforming the technological terminology in the statute is beyond the scope of this Note.
204. See Bellia, supra note 29, at 1396-97; supraPart III.C.
205. See infra Part IV.A-D.
206. See infra Part IV.A.
207. See infra Part IV.A.
208. See infra Part IV.B.
209. See infra Part IV.C.
210. See infra Part IV.D.
211. Contra Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 471 (ruling that the SCA warrant is a hybrid
between a subpoena and a warrant).
212. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (stating that
courts must enforce the plain meaning of a statute's language).
213. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
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The next issue to address is where the search and seizure of data
actually occurs. 214 This will turn on where the law considers the
information to be physically located. 215 The information could be
considered to be located where it is viewed on a computer screen, 2 16
where the server is located, 2 7 at the home or place of business of the
email account user,218 or at the ISP's headquarters where the ISP
ultimately controls the data.219 As a warrant, the standard for a
subpoena-which looks to control and requires the recipient to produce
the information regardless of the location-should not apply to an SCA
warrant.2 20 Rather, the most logical and strongest argument is that the
search should occur where the data is stored and, therefore, where the
server is located.221
B. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, When Available, Should Be the
AuthoritativeSource in DeterminingProceduresfor Executing Searches
and Seizures in Foreign Countries
In the Microsoft Case, Magistrate Judge Francis's opinion
described how burdensome the MLAT process is.222 While this may be
true, it should not give U.S. law enforcement officers the ability to
ignore these obligations.223 Magistrate Judge Francis opined
that the United States had entered into MLATs with only sixty countries
and concluded that, since U.S. law enforcement agencies do not have
any other legislative methods to rely on when executing a search or
seizure in other countries, Congress must have meant for the SCA to
apply extraterritorially. 224
214.

See Kerr, supra note 8, at 416; see also In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at

Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 757 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (ruling that two searches occur
when executing the search and seizure of a computer: (1) searching for the computer and (2)
searching the information stored on the computer).
215. See Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Provider to Disclose Data
Stored Abroad?, supranote 111.

216.
217.
218.
Protocol
219.

Kerr, supra note 156, at 551.
Id
See Kerr, supra note 8, at 416. This location could be determined by obtaining the Internet
or IP address of the email account holder. Id.
See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 472.

220. See id.
221. See Microsoft Ireland Case: Can a US Warrant Compel a US Provider to Disclose Data
Stored Abroad?, supra note I 11.
222. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 474.

223. See Shipchandler, supra note 176; Drew Mitnick, The Urgent Need for MLAT Reform,
ACCESSNOW (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:42 PM), https://www.accessnow.org/blog/2014/09/12/the-urgentneeds-for-mlat-reform.
224. See Microsoft Case, supra note 15, at 475.
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However, when a judge considers whether to issue a § 2703(a)
warrant, she should first determine whether an MLAT exists between the
United States and the country in which law enforcement seeks to execute
the search and seizure.22 5 If there is an existing MLAT, U.S. law
enforcement agencies must be bound by whatever procedures are
outlined in the existing agreement. 226 Therefore, the language in the
SCA should be changed to reinforce this notion.2 27 Further, if the statute
includes language that holds U.S. officers accountable to MLATs, it will
provide further assurance toward international comity. 22 8 If the
procedures are truly cumbersome, as some suggest,229 then perhaps there
should be a reform in the MLAT structure, rather than using the SCA or
some other federal statute to skirt the issue.230
C.

Justice Scalia'sInterpretationof the Conflict-of-Law Test Should
Be Applied in Conjunctionwith the Stored CommunicationsAct

Although further procedures should be available to allow law
enforcement agencies to obtain the information sought, it is still
necessary to respect the sovereignty of foreign nations and the
constitutional protections of U.S. citizens.23 ' Although Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire Insurance v. California is not
controlling, his interpretation of the conflict-of-law test in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States

225. But see id.
226. See Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869) (holding that the United States is bound by the
terms of a treaty once the Senate ratifies it); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293
(1933) (stating that treaties should be construed to secure equality and reciprocity between the
contracting countries).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). It should be noted that such language is not imperative, as a
treaty has full effect and force once ratified by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art.
VI, cl. 2 ("This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land." (emphasis added)). Including this language in the SCA will simply
further memorialize the MLAT and ensure adherence to it.
228. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that the
United States must honor the sovereign respect owed to foreign nations and, as such, should not
compel the production of information that would violate a foreign nation's laws).
229. See Pope, supra note 188, at 1931; ALAT: A Four-Letter Word In Need OfReform, supra
note 17.
230. However, discussing and analyzing MLAT reform is beyond the scope of this Note.
231. See supra Part II.B-C. It should be noted that the application of this standard should not
begin until after it has already been determined that an MLAT between the United States and the
foreign nation does not exist. See supra Part IV.B. Further, this standard should only be applied
when law enforcement agencies are seeking data stored through an ISP organized pursuant to the
laws of the United States, but the data server is located abroad.
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("Restatement (Third)") is neutral and comprehensive.2 32 Applying this
test to the SCA should be the first step to ensure prescriptive comity and
fairness when attempting to execute an SCA warrant in a foreign
nation.233 After determining that there is no MLAT between the United
States and the foreign nation where the desired information is located, a
judge should use the balancing test set forth in the Restatement (Third)
and HartfordFire Insurance.23 4 This standard would ensure protection
for constitutional rights and comity, forcing a judge to balance the
legitimate interests of all involved in the case.235
When considering an application for an SCA warrant to be
executed abroad, a judge should first consider if the United States has a
reasonable interest in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 36
Determining whether the United States has a reasonable interest in
exercising jurisdiction will rely on the following non-exhaustive factors:
the conduct's relation to the United States; 237 the extent of the effect of
the conduct being regulated on the United States; 2 38 the nationality of the
person responsible for the conduct; 239 the importance of issuing the

warrant; 240 the expectations which might be impacted if the warrant is
not issued;2 4 1 "the importance of regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system"; 24 2 whether exercising such jurisdiction
would be consistent with the accepted norms of international law; 2 43
whether exercising jurisdiction would offend the sovereignty of another
country; 24 and "the likelihood of conflict" with the foreign nation
232. See Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-17 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
233. See id. at 817. This Note does not consider the outcome when foreign nations deny
assistance in executing a U.S. search warrant abroad.
234. See id. at 818-19; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).

235. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et, L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d
1168, 1176-78 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
236. See HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(2)(a).
238. See id.
239. See id. § 403(2)(b).
240. See id. § 403(2)(c). Section 403(2)(c) considers "the character of the activity to be
regulated" and "the importance of [the] regulation." Id. Rather than the character of the activity
being regulated, the court should mostly consider how important issuing the warrant is to the
ongoing investigation, since the SCA refers to "ongoing criminal investigation[s]." See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) (2012).
241. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(2)(d).
242. See id
243. See id.
244. See id.

§ 402(2)(e).
§ 403(2)(f).
§ 403(2)(g).
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storing the electronic information.245 The answer to whether the United
States has a reasonable interest will likely be affirmative since SCA
warrants are only issued when a law enforcement officer can show
probable cause.246 In the unlikely event that the United States does not
have a reasonable interest in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
inquiry must end there-jurisdiction should not be exercised and a judge
should not issue a warrant. 247
However, if there is a reasonable interest, the inquiry must
continue. A judge must next consider the interests of the foreign nation
where the information is stored using the same factors listed above. 2 4 8 If,
after weighing all of these factors, a judge concludes that the foreign
nation has the greater interest, the United States should have to defer to
that country's sovereignty and a judge should not issue a warrant.249
Conversely, if a judge determines that the United States has the greater
interest, she should then turn to the second prong of this Note's proposed
test and consider the individual rights being affected. 250
D.

The Minimum Contacts Testfor PersonalJurisdictionShould Be
Applied in Conjunction with the Stored Communications Act

The second prong of the test suggested by this Note is to consider
whether an individual email account holder has sufficient minimum
contacts with the United States so that issuance of a warrant will not
offend notions of due process. 251 This portion of the test is governed by
the guiding principles set forth in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington25 2 and Hanson v. Denckla.253 In determining whether such
contacts exist, a judge should consider whether the person or entity
holding an email account could have reasonably anticipated being "haled

245. See id. § 403(2)(h).
246. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1).
247. See Hartford Fire Ins. v. Califomia, 509 U.S. 764, 819 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(2); supra notes
249.

237-45 and accompanying text.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 403(3).
250. See id.; infra Part IV.D.
251. See United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
252. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that, for someone not physically present within the
jurisdiction, there be "certain minimum contacts," so that being brought to court there does not
"offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice").
253. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that unilateral activity is not enough-the defendant
must have "purposefully avail[ed himself| of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws").
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into court," 254 or in this case, subjected to a warrant.255 If the person or
entity's contact with the United States results from the unilateral acts of
a third party, then extraterritorial jurisdiction should not be exercised.256
This is because it would be unfair to force a person or entity to be under
the jurisdiction of the United States if they are subject to the warrant
solely due to someone else's conduct.257
Therefore, this Note suggests that courts should consider an email
account holder's minimum contacts with the United States. 25 8 If the
account holder maintains the requisite minimum contacts with the
United States, then it would be reasonable for a court to issue a
warrant. 25 9 This prong of the proposed test would help ensure fairness on
a micro level by looking to the individual's conduct.260
V.

CONCLUSION

When created, the SCA was a great effort to extend Fourth
Amendment protections to newly emerging modes of communication.2 61
However, Congress could not have foreseen the web of complexity and
lack of protection that advancements in technology have created.262 Case
law and the resulting controversies surrounding warrants issued pursuant
to § 2703(a) of the SCA have brought to light the areas that Congress
failed to consider when drafting the SCA, such as whether the SCA was
intended to have extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 63 Courts have little
guidance on this topic, and legislative reform is necessary to help answer
this and other questions posed by the SCA. 26
Thus, when a judge considers a warrant application for information
stored on a data server overseas and the ISP is located in the United
States, the two-prong test proposed in this Note should be applied.265
This test considers the notions of international comity on a macro scale,

254. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (2012).
256. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
257. See id.
258. See United States v. Juda, 797 F. Supp. 774, 779 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
259. See id. Account holders may not have such minimum contacts, for example, when law
enforcement officers are trying to obtain the emails or electronic data of people not directly
involved in the suspected crime. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
260. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
261. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3 (1986).
262. See Kerr, supranote 12, at 1209, 1234.
263. See supra Part II.A, C.
264. See supra Part HI.A-C.
265. See supra Part IV.
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as well as an individual's rights on a micro scale.266 Applying such a
standard would help ensure diplomatic relations, which are more
important than ever in this "shrinking" world, while also protecting the
substantive individual protections that our Constitution holds dear.267
Lindsay La Marca*

266. See supra Part IV.C-D.
267. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Maier, supra
note 24, at 589; Duncan, supra note 201; supra Part IV.D.
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